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1I.
I.
Introduction
At the age of eighteen, Britney Spears has reached super-
star status. She has
sold millions of albums, and her music videos are among
MTV's most popular. Teenage boys idolize her, and teenage
girls strive to look like her. Unfortunately, good genes alone
may not account for Britney's sought after appearance.
Recent reports allege that the teen idol underwent breast
augmentation surgery last year, at the age of seventeen.1
Although Britney denied the reports, other stars such as
Pamela Anderson Lee owe much of their fame to well-
publicized breast augmentation procedures. In fact, the
American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons
(ASPRS) has reported a steady increase in the demand for
all types of cosmetic surgery ranging from rhinoplasty to
breast augmentation.2 According to statistics compiled by
the ASPRS, the number of procedures performed in the
United States has increased 152 percent since 1992, to well
over a million procedures a year. Twenty-ve percent of
those procedures are performed on patients under the age
of 34.3 As these statistics indicate, cosmetic surgery has be-
come quite common, despite the disastrous history of what
was once a highly popular cosmetic surgery procedure: sil-
icone gel breast augmentation.
1See Chrissy Illey, Britney is 18 but She's Already Had Breast Implants and There are
Plenty of Other Young Americans Queuing to go Under the Knife, The Scotsman, Jan. 28,
2000, at 22; see also Alex Tresniowski et. al., Britney's Wild Ride, People, Feb. 14, 2000, at
98 (reporting on Britney's denial of the breast implant rumors).
2See Nancy Ryan, Cosmetic Surgery Jumps 50 Percent: Liposuc-
tion and Breast Augmentation Top Procedures (visited Mar. 1, 2000)
<http://www.plasticsurgery.org/mediactr/99stats.htm>; see also Illey, supra note 1, at
22.
3See Illey, supra note 1, at 22.
2A. The Development of the Silicone Breast Implant
For over a century, women around the world have used various methods
to enlarge their breast size. As Dr. Marcia Angell explains in her book,
Science on Trial: The Clash of Medical Evidence and the Law in the Breast Implants Case,
the rst recorded breast augmentation procedure occurred in Germany in 1895
and involved transplanting fat from a benign tumor on a woman's back to her
breasts.4 Before turning to silicone, doctors tried injecting a variety of sub-
stances such as paran wax, petroleum jelly, beeswax and vegetable oils di-
rectly into the patient's breast.5 The start of World War II, however, brought
about increased innovation in many elds, including medicine. Scientists had
stabilized silicone just prior to the start of the war, and silicone became quite
valuable during the war because of its uses in lubrication, sealing, and insula-
tion. Soon doctors began to investigate possible medical uses of silicone and
discovered that the substance had many properties considered useful in the
medical eld. For example, silicone is inert when inserted into the human body,
does not degrade, resists bacterial contamination and is easily tolerated by the
human body.6 These properties have made silicone one of the most widely used
substances in medicine, and it is still a key component in important medical
devices such as articial joints, heart valves, needle lubrications and tubing.7
The rst reported attempt to enlarge the breast using liquid silicone also oc-
4See Marcia Angell, M.D., Science on Trial: The Clash of Medical Evidence and
the Law in the Breast Implant Case 35 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1997) (1996).
5See id.
6See id at 36.
7See id.
3curred during World War II when Japanese women had the substance injected
directly into their breasts in an attempt to please American servicemen stationed
in Japan. The women believed that the American men preferred bigger breasts
and took drastic measures to satisfy this preference.8 As Judy Foreman explains
in her article, \Women and Silicone: A History of Risk," those performing the
augmentation procedures for the Japanese women usually injected the women
with a type of silicone commonly used as an industrial strength transformer
coolant and stolen from barrels kept on the docks of Japanese cities.9 Unfortu-
nately, this type of silicone also contained contaminants that would irritate the
breast tissue and tended to ooze into the rest of the body.10
Despite these problems, the idea of using silicone injections to enlarge women's
breasts gained popularity and by the 1960s had spread to the United States, as
Daniel Q. Posin discusses in his article, \Silicone Breast Implant Litigation and
My Father-in-Law: A Neo-Coasean Analysis."11 The procedure gained partic-
ular popularity among Las Vegas showgirls and waitresses who believed that
larger breasts would increase their popularity with the male customers.12 In
fact, silicone injections became such a popular method of breast augmentation
that in the space of a few short years approximately 50,000 American women
had undergone the procedure.13 Unfortunately, these women did not escape
the problems experienced by the Japanese women who rst used the silicone
8See id at 35.
9See Judy Foreman, Women and Silicone: A History of Risk, The Boston Globe, Jan.
19,1992, at 1.
10See id.
11See Daniel Q. Posin, Silicone Breast Implant Litigation and My Father-in-Law: A Neo-
Coasean Analysis, 70 Tul. L. Rev. 2565, *2567-68 (1996).
12See id.
13See Foreman, supra note 9, at 1.
4injections. As the silicone used in early breast enlargement procedures, like
that used in Japan during World War II, often came from unregulated sources,
women desiring larger breasts ran the risk of receiving injections of bacteria-
contaminated silicone. Furthermore, those performing the procedure often used
contaminated needles, which increased the woman's risk of contracting infec-
tions.14 These infections could cause gangrenous sores to develop on the skin
around the breast.15 Moreover, it became common practice to purposely add
contaminants such as olive oil to the silicone in order to cause the formation of
scar tissue around the injection and minimize oozing. This practice converted
the silicone from a substance that ordinarily produced only a mild inammatory
reaction to one that could produce inammation so severe as to cause tumor-
like lumps to develop around the breast.16 These lumps not only disgured the
breast, but also caused the woman enormous pain. Even if the augmentation
procedure did not cause inammation or infection, it produced other side ef-
fects such as hardening of the breasts, connective tissue pain, and interference
with the detection of cancer.17 In fact, as Mary White Stewart describes in
her book, Silicone Spills: Breast Implants on Trial, in 1965 the problems with
silicone injections led the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to classify
these injections as a drug under x201 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA).18 This classication allowed the FDA to regulate silicone injections,
14See Angell, supra note 4, at 38.
15See id.
16See id.
17See Posin, supra note 11, at *2568.
18See Mary White Stewart, Silicone Spills: Breast Implants on Trial 17 (Praeger
1998); see also Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. x 321 (1998).
5and based on the serious problems with the injections, the agency quickly acted
to ban their use.19 Thus, even at this early stage in the development of silicone
breast augmentation, it became apparent that articial methods to increase the
size of the breast were not risk-free.
Despite the early problems with breast augmentation procedures, doctors
continued to try to provide women with a permanent way to achieve their de-
sired breast size. In 1961, Dr. Thomas Cronin and Dr. Frank Gerow, plastic
surgeons practicing in Texas, began to develop what has become the most fa-
mous type of breast implant: the silicone gel breast implant.20 This implant
consisted of silicone gel encased in a malleable silicone bag, and its developers
touted the new implant as an improvement on the silicone injection method.21
For example, the silicone bags, for the most part, ensured that the liquid silicone
remained in the proper place in the body and reduced the irritation associated
with injections of large amounts of unpuried liquid silicone directly into the
patient's body. The silicone implants felt more natural than the alternatives,
and plastic surgeons could easily customize their size to give the woman the
desired increase in breast size.22 In addition, the simplicity of the procedure
used to insert the implants into the body contributed to their popularity. Sil-
icone breast augmentation procedures, even by modern standards, were quite
simple. They required only two small incisions, which the surgeon usually made
19See Stewart, supra note 18, at 17.
20See Angell, supra note 4, at 39.
21See id.
22See id.
6under the crease of the breast. The surgeon then formed a pocket behind the
breast and in front of the pectoral muscle where the implant would sit and push
forward the woman's own breast tissue.23 In cases of post-mastectomy breast
reconstruction, the procedure was only slightly more complicated because the
surgeon had to place the implant behind the pectoral muscle, against the ribs,
or between muscles. Also, the surgeon had to reconstruct a nipple, usually using
skin taken from other areas of the woman's body.24 Even considering the addi-
tional complications posed by the case of breast reconstruction, silicone implant
surgery, as explained by the ASPRS, only took around two hours to complete,
and the average patient could resume most activities within 48 hours.25 As a
result, the new silicone implants quickly became the preferred method of breast
augmentation for millions of women.26
The silicone breast implants developed by Dr. Cronin and Dr. Gerow remained
the most popular form of breast implants until the FDA, citing potentially se-
rious health risks, severely limited their availability in April 1992. Among the
problems noted early on with the use of silicone breast implants were contrac-
tures, leakage, rupture, and diculties with mammography. First, contractures
resulted from the formation of scar tissue around the point of insertion of the
implant. This scar tissue formed a capsule that surrounded the implant and
then contracted. This capsular contracture squeezed the implant and resulted
23See id at 39-40.
24See id.
25See American Society of Plastic Surgeons, Breast Augmentation (visited Mar. 10, 2000)
<http://www.plasticsurgery.org/surgery/brstaugm.htm#7>.
26See Angell, supra note 4, at 40.
7in a hardening of the breast tissue around the implant.27 In addition, as the scar
tissue contracted, it often caused the implant to bulge. This bulging was notice-
able and extremely painful. Surgeons quickly developed a procedure called a
\closed capsulotomy" to deal with the capsular contracture problem. This pro-
cedure involved forcibly rupturing the scar tissue by hand but unfortunately,
often also ruptured the implant itself. In addition, it was rarely completely suc-
cessful because the scar tissue that caused the original problem simply reformed
over time.28
The second problem noticed early on in the development of silicone im-
plants was leakage. Doctors discovered in the 1970s that the implants tended
to \bleed," resulting in the release of small amounts of silicone into the body.29
Although the capsule of scar tissue limited most of the leakage, doctors exam-
ining patients suering from leakage had discovered silicone particles in lymph
glands surrounding the breast.30 The implants also leaked silicone into the
surrounding tissue when they ruptured. Rupture was a more serious problem
because it caused the breast to lose its shape. Finally, the implants made the
detection of cancer through mammography more dicult. They interfered with
the passage of x-rays through the breast, and in order to get an accurate image
the technicians needed to take great care to maneuver the x-ray around the
implant.31 Although these early problems ranged from inconvenient to painful,
27See id.
28See id at 41.
29See id.
30See id.
31See id at 42.
8as discussed in later sections of this paper, they paled in comparison to the mul-
titude of symptoms including lupus, rheumatoid arthritis, memory loss, chronic
fatigue syndrome, and insomnia cited by the thousands of women involved in
the breast implant litigation of the 1990s.32
B.
The Choice to Undergo Breast Augmentation Surgery
As the above discussion demonstrates, even before the start of the
silicone breast implant litigation, the decision to increase the size of a healthy
breast by inserting a silicone gel lled implant into the body should have at least
caused women to give serious consideration the potential downsides of the pro-
cedure. However, as the statistics compiled by the ASPRS demonstrate, breast
augmentation has always been one of the most popular forms of plastic surgery.
In 1998 alone, plastic surgeons performed over 132,000 breast augmentation pro-
cedures, 10,000 more procedures than in the previous year.33 In addition, even
in the aftermath of the silicone breast implant litigation, breast augmentation
surgery for cosmetic purposes (using saline lled implants) continues to make
up the vast majority of augmentation procedures with post mastectomy breast
reconstruction accounting for only twenty percent of implant procedures.34 This
statistic is amazing considering the panic created by the litigation and the news
32See Posin, supra note 11, at *2568.
33See American Society of Plastic Surgeons, National Clearinghouse of Plastic Surgery
Statistics (visited Mar. 5, 2000) <http://www.plasticsurgery.org/mediactr/trends92-98.htm>.
34See Stewart, supra note 18, at 56.
9coverage of the silicone breast implant controversy and prompts a look at the
reasoning behind the decision to receive breast implants.
As Julie M. Spanbauer explains in her article, \Breast Implants as Beauty Rit-
ual: Woman's Sceptre and Prison," throughout history and across cultures,
women have taken measures of varying extremes to meet the societal view of
beauty.35 In the 1800s, women wore corsets to achieve the ideal waist size de-
spite the fact that achieving the tiny waist in fashion at the time often required
allocating over 30 minutes to tighten the strings on the corset suciently. In
addition, wearing such a constricting undergarment every day often caused the
woman to experience severe pain and damaged her internal organs.36 The Chi-
nese culture, on the other hand, did not idealize women with tiny waists but
rather those with tiny feet. In order to comport with this notion of beauty, Chi-
nese women had their feet tightly bound at birth. Although the women with
the smallest feet were considered the most beautiful, they were also unable to
stand or walk without assistance as a result of the foot binding.37 Although
these examples represent two of the more extreme measures taken by women in
the name of beauty, they demonstrate the lengths to which women have gone
throughout history in pursuit of the feminine ideal and provide a historical
background in which to understand modern cosmetic surgery.38 As Spanbauer
argues, when:
[s]ituated in this historical context, breast augmentation
35See Julie M. Spanbauer, Breast Implants as Beauty Ritual: Woman's Sceptre and Prison,
9 Yale J.L. & Feminism 157, *163 (1997).
36See id at *166-67.
37See id at *164.
38See id at *168.
10surgery appears to be a natural technological evolution in
feminine beauty practices. We accept it as part of our
culture because women voluntarily engage in the practice
and also because society at large is probably unaware of
the level of pain, damage, and even deformity that can
result from a `successful' augmentation surgery.39
She notes that for the past two decades, the ideal of the perfect woman has
become progressively thinner and the ideal breast size has increased. These two
factors, which are quite dicult to achieve individually, in combination become
all but unattainable characteristics for the average woman.40 As a result, more
and more women have turned to articial methods in their pursuit of the beauty
ideal.
As Susan M. Zimmerman explains in her book, Silicone Survivors: Women's Experience with Breast Implants,
the decision to undergo breast augmentation surgery results from the interac-
tion of a variety of cultural forces.41 Zimmerman debates the assertion of many
feminist theorists, such as Kathy Davis and Susan Bordo, that women undergo-
ing plastic surgery often view the procedure as a liberating event.42 Davis and
Bordo have rejected the notion of women as \cultural dopes, who have been
blinded by the promise of a new body."43 Davis has concluded from interviews
with many women who have undergone cosmetic surgery that the women often
had a full understanding of the cultural and interpersonal forces leading them
to opt for cosmetic surgery. According to Davis, these women recognized the
39Id.
40See id at *167.
41See Susan M. Zimmerman, Silicone Survivors: Women's Experience with Breast
Implants 55 (Temp. U. Press 1998).
42See id at 44.
43Id.
11interaction between their self-esteem and their outward appearance and viewed
cosmetic surgery as a way to freedom from the suering caused by an imperfect
body image.44 Bordo also has found that women feel liberated by the decision
to undergo cosmetic surgery but has argued that Davis has placed too little
emphasis on the cultural, historical, and social standards that cause women to
believe that success comes from beauty.45 Although each theorist has a some-
what dierent conception of the forces that lead a woman to alter her body,
they agree that women, for the most part, are not blindly taken in by media
images. However, as Zimmerman explains, women, when deciding to undergo
breast augmentation surgery, may be simultaneously aware of the cultural forces
that inuence their decision and strongly pressured by those forces to achieve
the feminine ideal.46
Other theorists have taken a more extreme view of the reasoning that leads
a woman to undergo breast augmentation surgery. They portray women as
nearly incapable of separating self-worth from body image.47 For example,
Stewart asserts that \[a]lthough American women are not likely to be killed by
their husbands for not bringing in the promised dowry or bride price, the physi-
cal manipulation and interventions they endure { from liposuction to facelifts to
waxes and peels { are a direct result of their relative economic powerlessness."48
That is, in this view, a woman's sense of power and sense of self derive totally
from her body. Moreover, her power and well being are directly related to her
44See id.
45See id at 44-5.
46See id at 46.
47See Stewart, supra note 18, at 55-60 (discussing the work of Tse elon, Wolf and others).
48Id at 56-7.
12attractiveness to men.49 This group of theorists asserts that the connection be-
tween power and appearance is perpetuated by the fact that over 90% of plastic
surgeons are male.50 Thus, plastic surgeons inevitably bring to their practice
the male perspective of what makes a woman attractive.51
Although interesting, the view discussed in Stewart's book is extreme. It
seems a
rather large overstatement to suggest that, despite the advances made to-
ward gender equality, women derive all of their power and self-worth from their
outward appearance. However, what is evident from the above discussion is that
women deciding to undergo any cosmetic procedure act under the inuence of
a variety of external pressures, most of which direct them toward having the
procedure. Given the large amount of discussion both in academic settings and
in the popular media regarding the pursuit of beauty, women are likely all the
more aware of these forces and their inuence on the decision making process.
What is cause for concern is the possibility that these cultural inuences exert
so much pressure on women and are of such a systemic nature that they greatly
compromise the decision making process. That is, cultural forces driving women
to pursue the beauty ideal may cause otherwise rational and capable actors to
give less weight than is reasonable to the risks of a given cosmetic procedure.52
The Australian author Loane Skene has suggested this theory in his article \In
49See id at 54-5.
50See Spanbauer, supra note 35, at *174.
51See Zimmerman, supra note 41, at 56.
52See Loane Skene, In Their Mind's Eye: A Dierent Direction for Cosmetic Surgery
Consent Cases, 1996 TLJ LEXIS 26, *2.
13Their Mind's Eye: A Dierent Direction for Cosmetic Surgery Consent Cases,"
and it goes a long way in explaining why, even after the silicone breast implant
disaster, cosmetic surgery, including breast augmentation, is more popular than
ever.53 It also is an important argument in favor of the FDA's actions regarding
silicone breast implants and in favor of requiring plastic surgeons to be specic
in their description of the risks of a particular procedure.54
Cosmetic surgery has become glamorized in American society, and as a re-
sult, its risks have been de-emphasized. Although women should be able to
and are capable of making decisions regarding cosmetic surgery, they are also
entitled to complete information so that their decisions are truly informed de-
cisions. The FDA, through its regulation of breast implants under the medical
device provisions of the FDCA, played an important role in encouraging women
to take a step back and truly consider the ramications of their decision. In fact,
although many critics of the FDA have cited the silicone breast implant con-
troversy as evidence of the agency's ineectiveness, a closer look at the events
leading up to the regulation of silicone implants reveals the dangers of allowing
the medical device industry to self-regulate. If anything, the silicone breast im-
plant controversy provides strong evidence to support ecient regulation.
53See id.
54See id.
14II.
The Road to Regulation
A.
The Medical Device Act of 1976
As Richard A. Merrill explains in his article, \The Archi-
tecture of Government
Regulation of Medical Products," Congress vested the FDA
with the authority to regulate the safety and marketing of
food and drugs in the Food and Drug Act of 1906. How-
ever, it took another seventy years for Congress to expand
fully the FDA's authority to monitor medical devices.55 It
was through this expanded jurisdiction over medical de-
vices that the FDA derived its authority to regulate silicone
breast implants.
Congress rst gave the FDA limited authority over medical devices in 1938,
and the 1938 Act dened the word \device" expansively. According to the
1938 Amendments, the word \device" included \'instruments, apparatus, and
contrivances...intended (1) for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment,
or prevention of disease in man or other animals; or (2) to aect the structure
or any function of the body of man or other animals."'56 Despite this expansive
denition of device, the FDA's authority to regulate medical devices was actually
quite limited, and the agency did not spend much time or resources in this
55See Richard A. Merrill, Symposium on Regulating Medical Innovation: The Architecture
of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1753, *1800 (1996).
56Id at *1800 n.139.
15area.57 In fact, the 1938 Amendments only permitted the FDA to challenge
\the sale of products that it believed were adulterated (unsanitary or unsafe)
or misbranded (bearing false or misleading claims)."58 At this stage in the
development of medical device regulation, Congress did not permit the FDA
to require proof of safety or eectiveness from the manufacturers of medical
devices.59 Thus, the FDA encountered some diculty in its eorts to remove
devices from the market and did not have the resources to spend on what often
became time consuming enforcement actions.60 However, in the early part of the
twentieth century, the need for medical device regulation had not yet become
imperative. Simple instruments used by doctors and hospitals made up the vast
majority of devices during this time, and most medical devices in use during
the 1920s and 1930s did not require surgical insertion into the body.61
The years following World War II, however, marked the advent of a new
era of medical device development.62 It was a time of great innovation in the
medical eld with the development of articial joints, pacemakers, and cosmetic
implants, but with this increased innovation, the FDA became more concerned
with the need to test the safety and eectiveness of these devices prior to mar-
keting.63 This concern led the agency to attempt to circumvent its limited
authority under the 1938 Amendments by classifying certain medical devices
57See id.
58Id at *1802.
59See id at *1803.
60See id *1803 n. 154.
61See id at *1801-02.
62See id at *1803.
63See id.
16as new drugs under the broad denition of the word \drug" provided in the
1938 Food and Drug Act. The classication of devices as \new drugs" rather
than \devices" allowed the FDA to require manufacturers to test their safety
and get FDA approval prior to marketing the product.64 Despite some initial
successes, the FDA's regulation of devices in this way depended on a question-
able reading of the denition of \drug," and the agency was never quite sure
how far it could proceed in its regulation of devices under this structure.65 As
the medical device industry developed more complex and intrusive products, it
became apparent that Congress needed to develop specic provisions to enable
the FDA to adequately serve its consumer protection function in the area of
medical devices.
Congress developed these provisions in the 1976 Medical Device Amend-
ments.66 The 1976 Amendments gave the FDA expanded power to regulate
medical devices by permitting the agency to establish good manufacturing re-
quirements, to prohibit dangerous products, and to impose notication and
replacement requirements on manufacturers of defective products.67 The pri-
mary goals of the 1976 Amendments, as enumerated by Ashley W. Warren in,
\Preemption of Claims Related to Class III Medical Devices: Are the Federal
Objectives of Health and Safety Furthered or Hindered," were to \'(1) assure
public protection against unsafe and ineective devices; (2) ensure that health
64See id.
65See id at *1806.
66See id at *1808.
67See id.
17practitioners can be condent about the medical equipment they use or pre-
scribe for their patients; and (3) provide market protection for pioneers of new
medical technologies."'68 Congress hoped this increased authority over medical
devices would better enable the FDA to fulll its role as a guardian of public
health and safety, but also hoped to protect the competing interest of protecting
medical science from unwarranted governmental intrusion.69 These competing
and important goals have often put the FDA in the dicult position of deciding
how far it should intervene in the area of medical device innovation and were
particularly apparent during the silicone breast implant controversy.
The delicate balance between promoting innovation and protecting consumers
was evident in the mechanics of the 1976 Amendments, which established a
detailed program for dealing with medical devices. The 1976 Amendments, in
short, required the FDA to inventory and classify all medical devices as Class I,
II, or III devices.70 This classication system still governs medical device regula-
tion today and is contained in x513 of the FDCA.71 Class I devices require only
as much control as is necessary to ensure the reasonable safety and eective-
ness of the device.72 They are subject to prohibitions against misbranding and
adulteration and to requirements of pre-market notication and registration.73
Class I devices include, for example, elastic bandages and tongue depressors.74
68Ashley W. Warren, Preemption of Claims Related to Class III Medical Devices: Are the
Federal Objectives of Public Health and Safety Furthered or Hindered, 49 SMU L. Rev. 619,
*624 (1996).
69See id.
70See Merrill, supra note 55, at *1809.
71See Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. x 360c (1998).
72See Merrill, supra note 55, at *1809.
73See id.
74See Warren, supra note 68, at *625.
18Class II devices are those for which the FDA requires safety performance stan-
dards. Manufacturers of Class II devices must provide sucient information
regarding the device to allow for the development of a safety and eectiveness
standard. A standard for a Class II device generally establishes key features
and characteristics of the device.75 Once a standard for the device has been
established, the FDA will block the entry to the market of any device that does
not meet that standard.76 For example, hearing aids and resuscitators are Class
II devices.77 Class III devices require the most regulation and include those de-
vices with too little information to establish a performance standard or those
that potentially pose great risk to the patient.78 These devices are subject to
a pre-market testing and approval scheme similar to that used for new drugs.79
Silicone breast implants are considered Class III devices.
The importance of this structure to the silicone breast implant issue soon be-
came evident. With the enactment of the 1976 Amendments, the FDA found
itself facing the challenging task of classifying an enormous amount of devices,
developing regulations to implement the amendments, and reviewing pre-market
approval applications for devices without pre-1976 equivalents. This task took
more time than either the drafters' of the amendments or the FDA itself likely
had anticipated and forced the FDA to make certain decisions regarding the
allocation of its limited resources.80 In fact, the very structure of pre-market
75See Merrill, supra note 55, at *1809.
76See id.
77See Warren, supra note 68, at *625.
78See Merrill, supra note 55, at *1809; see also Warren, supra note 68, at *625.
79See Merrill, supra note 55, at *1809; see also Warren, supra note 68, at *625.
80See Merrill, supra note 55, at *1812-13.
19review procedures established by the 1976 Amendments gave the FDA a way to
allocate its resources to the task at hand in what, at the time, seemed an eec-
tive way. That is, the amendments only required immediate pre-market review
for safety and eectiveness for \genuinely novel post-enactment devices and for
marketed devices assigned to Class III."81 Although the medical devices struc-
ture established by the 1976 Amendments also required pre-market review for
post-enactment devices substantially similar to pre-enactment Class III devices
and for pre-enactment Class III devices, this pre-market review requirement
only attached when the FDA formally requested pre-market approval applica-
tions from the manufacturers of such devices.82 As Congress did not provide
a timetable to govern the application process for these two types of Class III
devices, the FDA could proceed at a pace it found appropriate.83
Although commentators have argued that the FDA did not make progress
with regard to the regulation of these Class III devices at a suciently quick
pace, there is also adequate support for the argument that the FDA did the
best it could given the enormity of the task at hand.84 Furthermore, Congress
had established a strict timetable for regulation of new devices without pre-
1976 equivalents and for completing the pre-market notication process. The
pre-market notication process required a manufacturer of a new device to give
the FDA ninety-day notication of its intent to sell the device so that the FDA
could determine if the new device was actually substantially similar to an already
81Id at *1812.
82See id at *1812-13.
83See id at *1813.
84See id.
20marketed device.85 Thus, the FDA made the decision to devote more attention
to new devices and pre-market notication than to devices in existence prior
to the enacting of the 1976 Amendments. Merrill sums up the FDA's dilemma
and explains:
[u]nder the circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising that
the Bureau [of Medical Devices] paid little attention to the
premarket approval requirement for pre-enactment Class III
devices and their post-1976 equivalents. Many had been in
use for several years. Most had undergone some clinical
testing, and patient experience in most instances had not
given rise to doubts about safety or eectiveness. More
than a decade passed without any determined eort by the
FDA to `clean up' the backlog of Class III devices for which
PMA applications were in theory required.86
Thus, the lack of attention paid to many Class III devices was likely the
result of a combination of factors including awed legislation and agency ine-
ciency. Even prior to the height of the breast implant controversy, the FDA was
judged harshly for its perceived inattention to Class III devices. In enacting the
1990 Amendments to the medical device provisions of the FDCA, the Senate
found that the FDA's track record regarding pre-1976 Class III devices had re-
sulted in an unacceptable threat to public safety.87 It certainly seemed that the
Senate was correct in its assessment when the breast implant controversy rose
to the level of mass hysteria in 1992.
B.
85See id at *1810-11.
86Id at *1814.
87See id at *1813 n 192.
21The FDA's Action Regarding Silicone Breast Implants
As discussed in earlier sections of this paper, there was
evidence early on in the
history of breast augmentation that women wishing to enlarge their breast size
using silicone implants were placing themselves at some risk. However, as Sylvia
A. Law describes in her article, \Tort Liability and the Availability of Contra-
ceptive Drugs and Devices in the United States," by the mid 1980s and early
1990s thousands of women began to claim that their silicone implants caused a
variety of systemic and even life threatening injuries.88 In addition, statistics
compiled by 1991 revealed that nearly two million women had received silicone
breast implants during the thirty years since their development in the 1960s.89
These statistics, coupled with the increasing number of women asserting prob-
lems with their implants, made evident the potential for a public health disaster
and likely played a dominant role in the FDA's sudden interest in silicone breast
implants in the late 1980s.
The FDA rst showed some interest in examining the safety of silicone implants
in 1982 when it proposed imposing a pre-market approval requirement on breast
implant manufacturers.90 This requirement, had it been nalized, would have
required manufacturers to provide safety information for silicone implants to
the FDA and may have avoided at least some of the hysteria that was to come.
88See Sylvia A. Law, Tort Liability and the Availability of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices
in the United States, 23 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 339, *44.
89See Zimmerman, supra note 41, at 20.
90See Angell, supra note 4, at 51.
22However, the FDA never nalized its proposal and did not address the issue of
silicone implants again until 1988, when some preliminary studies of the prod-
ucts had revealed a possible connection between connective tissue disease and
the implants.91 In addition, in 1986, the rst lawsuit brought by a woman
alleging that ruptured silicone implants had caused her to suer from chronic
fatigue syndrome and joint pain had resulted in a $1.7 million verdict for the
plainti.92 With these events swirling in the background and nearly 30 years
and two million women after the rst successful breast implant procedure, FDA
Commissioner David Kessler requested that breast implant manufacturers pro-
vide safety information about their products. According to the statute, they
had 30 months to gather the necessary safety information and present it to the
FDA for review.93
In the ensuing 30 months, many more women led claims against the manufac-
turers of silicone breast implants, particularly Dow Corning { the largest man-
ufacturer of silicone implants. Consumer groups such as Ralph Nader's Public
Citizen Health Research Group became more involved in the controversy, and
most of these groups became increasingly convinced that silicone implants posed
a considerable health risk to women.94 In fact, Dr. Sidney Wolfe, the president
of the Health Research Group had called for an all out ban of silicone breast
implants as early as 1988 citing insucient safety information.95 In his article,
\The Breast Implant Fiasco," David Bernstein asserts that Public Citizen ac-
91See id.
92See id; see also Law, supra note 88, at 46.
93See Angell, supra note 4, at 52.
94See Law, supra note 88, at 46.
95See Angell, supra note 4, at 53.
23tually played a critical role in fanning the re of the breast implant controversy
when the group released internal documents from Dow Corning demonstrating
a link between silicone and cancer in animals.96 These documents, as explained
in the later sections of this paper, discussed the results of monkey and dog
studies of the eects of silicone on the body and also played an important role
in some of the silicone implant lawsuits.97 In addition, Public Citizen obtained
and released FDA documents that revealed that some members of an FDA panel
convened in 1988 to study breast implants felt that the implants were dangerous
enough to warrant a consumer warning.98 In 1990, the group went even further
than simply publicizing its beliefs and led a lawsuit against the FDA under
the Freedom of Information Act to compel the FDA to release the results of the
animal tests.99
Although the Health Research Group's claims caused a panic among many
women, the documents it cited for support did not quite stand for what it
claimed.100 Dow Corning's animal studies mostly tested the eect of liquid
silicone on an animal when injected into dierent parts of the animal's body.
Some of these studies showed that silicone could travel through the body, and
those studies done on rats showed that the rats would develop sarcomas when
injected with the silicone. However, the studies generally did not test silicone as
96See David E. Bernstein, The Breast Implant Fiasco, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 457, *465 (1999);
see also Angell, supra note 4, at 53.
97See Bernstein, supra note 96, at *465; see also Angell, supra note 4, at 53.
98See Angell, supra note 4, at 52; see also Law, supra note 88, at 46.
99See Law, supra note 88, at 46; see also Teich v. FDA, 751 F. Supp.243, *20 (D.D.C.
1990).
100See Angell, supra note 4, at 57.
24used as part of a breast implant, and the sarcomas developed by the rats almost
never occur in human breast tissue. Moreover, rats regularly develop this type
of sarcoma when injected with any type of irritant.101 Thus, the relevance of the
tests to the safety of breast implants in women was not as clear as the Health
Research Group asserted.102 In fact, over the course of its examination of the
safety of silicone breast implants the FDA did consider the information brought
to light by the animal tests and concluded that they did not demonstrate that
the implants posed a signicant cancer risk in humans.103 Unfortunately, it
proved much more dicult to reassure women that their implants posed little
risk of cancer than it was to alarm them regarding the risk of a potentially
incurable disease.
To make matters worse for those entrusted with the task of reaching an ob-
jective conclusion regarding the safety of silicone breast implants, Public Citizen
Health Research Group was only one of many organizations and news sources to
publicize the multitude of potential problems with silicone implants. A group
called Command Trust Network boosted the litigation of the breast implant is-
sue by referring women to attorneys.104 In addition, the news media eventually
noticed the restorm surrounding silicone breast implants and began to print
and televise regular coverage of the developments in the breast implant saga.
A December 1990 segment of \Face to Face with Connie Chung" was a par-
101See id at 58.
102See id at 60.
103See Bernstein, supra note 96, at *466.
104See Angell, supra note 4, at 53.
25ticularly memorable news story focusing on silicone breast implants. Millions
of Americans viewed this program, which sent a denite message that silicone
breast implants caused a variety of serious illnesses.105 The program relied on
two doctors to support the causal link between silicone implants and disease but
did not reveal that the doctors were paid experts for the plaintis in silicone
implant litigation. Chung also interviewed many women who claimed that their
implants had caused them to become ill but did not present the other side of
the issue.106 As Bernstein states, \Chung's tendentious coverage favoring the
plaintis claims set the tone for media coverage of breast implants for the next
ve years" when a more balanced report would have been more useful for all
involved.107 While these citizens' groups and news organizations undoubtedly
served to increase awareness of a potential health problem, they did not foster
the development of an unbiased account of the breast implant issue. Instead,
they became instrumental in the creation of the mass hysteria that surrounded
the breast implant controversy from beginning to end, impeded the fact-nders
in their eorts to arrive at an objective resolution of the issue, and did little to
reassure panicked women.
However, the manufacturers also did not do much to help their case. By 1991,
they still had not provided the FDA with safety information regarding their
products.108 Commissioner Kessler, realized that the FDA had yet to resolve
the issue of the safety of silicone implants and determined to speed the pro-
105See id.
106See Bernstein, supra note 96, at *468.
107Id.
108See Angell, supra note 4, at 54.
26cess along. In April 1991, he informed the manufacturers that they had ninety
days to provide the agency with completed pre-market approval applications
for their products.109 According to this deadline, manufacturers had until July
9, 1991 to complete their safety tests and compile the information necessary to
permit the FDA to reach a decision regarding the status of silicone breast im-
plants.110 However, the July 9th deadline passed and only Mentor Corporation,
McGhan Medical Corporation, Dow Corning and Bioplasty, Inc. had submitted
pre-market approval applications to the FDA. Moreover, the FDA found the
safety data provided by these manufacturers inadequate.111 A few months after
the July 9th deadline, Bristol Myers Squibb, another major manufacturer of
breast implants, made public its decision to stop making the products citing an
inability to comply with the FDA's requests.112
In an eort to draw out more information regarding the safety of silicone breast
implants, Commissioner Kessler brought together members of the FDA General
and Plastic Surgery Devices Advisory Panel. This panel contained experts in a
variety of elds including plastic surgery, oncology, toxicology, immunology, psy-
chology and epidemiology. Members of business and consumer groups also sat
on the panel.113 It is likely that Commissioner Kessler hoped this panel would
be able to gather more information regarding the safety of the implants and
would permit the FDA to wade through the hysteria surrounding the implant
issue to nd the facts necessary to make an informed decision.
109See id.
110See Bernstein, supra note 96, at *470.
111See Angell, supra note 4, at 54.
112See id.
113See Bernstein, supra note 96, at *470.
27The FDA had heard testimony regarding the safety of silicone breast im-
plants when it rst proposed reclassifying the implants as Class III devices in
1982, in 1988 when its Plastic Surgery Advisory Committee met to discuss the
status of the implants, and in 1990 when Representative Ted Weiss held hearings
to address silicone's safety. However, the 1991 hearings generated a far more
comprehensive picture of the controversy.114 The panel heard from represen-
tatives of the American Medical Association (AMA) and the American Cancer
Society (ACS), both of which favored leaving the implants on the market.115
The ASPRS also made known its position, which favored leaving the implants
on the market. This position, of course, did not surprise those who had followed
the breast implant story as the ASPRS had a signicant monetary interest in
the continued marketing of breast implants.116 Ninety percent of plastic sur-
geons practicing in the United States consider themselves ASPRS members, and
in 1983 the group invested $4 million in an advertising campaign to publicize
breast implants as \'essential to women's mental health...."'117 On the other
hand, that the AMA and the ACS did not recommend banning the use of sili-
cone implants shocked many of those who did favor a ban.
Although the proponents of silicone implants had some well-respected groups on
their side, they also faced substantial opposition to their position from consumer
advocacy groups and from the many women who testied as to the hardships
caused them by their silicone implants.118 As Dr. Frank B. Vasey and Josh Feld-
114See Angell, supra note 4, at 54; see also Bernstein, supra note 96, at *463-65.
115See Angell, supra note 4, at 55.
116See id.
117Spanbauer, supra note 35, at *182.
118See Angell, supra note 4, at *55.
28stein recount in their book, The Silicone Breast Implant Controversy: What Women Need to Know,
22 groups and 60 women with implants explained their positions to the panel.119
At the conclusion of the testimony, the panel decided that the breast implant
manufacturers had not provided sucient data to demonstrate the safety of
their product.120 Specically, the panel found a lack of data regarding \the
chemical properties of implant materials, mechanical and physical properties of
the implants, frequency of adverse eects such as rupture and contracture, the
extent to which implants mask tumor detection in mammography, and risks
of cancer or immune disorders."121 This list demonstrated a substantial lack
of information and raises a question as to what relevant information, if any,
the manufacturers actually did provide to the FDA in the pre-market approval
applications. Despite these ndings, the panel recommended that the FDA
permit the continued availability of implants conditioned on the establishment
of a National Implant Registry to track implant recipients, the development
of an informed consent document for distribution to implant patients, and the
establishment of timeline for the submission of safety data to the FDA.122
The FDA took some time to review the ndings of the panel before making
any announcement regarding the status of silicone implants. In the intervening
months, litigation against the breast implant manufacturers continued, and this
litigation, in particular Hopkins v. Dow Corning, 33 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1994),
119See Frank B. Vasey, M.D. and Josh Feldstein, The Silicone Breast Implant Con-
troversy: What Women Need to Know 84 (The Crossing Press 1993).
120See id.
121Id.
122See id.
29brought renewed emphasis to information, similar to that released by Public
Citizen, that Dow Corning had withheld at least some information regarding
potential hazards of silicone implants.123 The documents in question had orig-
inally surfaced during discovery for the Stern case, which had resulted in the
rst major monetary award for a breast implant plainti.124 Dan Bolton, a
law clerk who did most of the work on the Stern case, had discovered internal
documents at the Dow Corning Plant in Midland, Michigan during his prepara-
tions for the case.125 Although the documents he relied on in Stern were placed
under seal at the conclusion of that case, he relied on those same documents
in his handling of the Hopkins case. As these documents had played such a
large role in two major breast implant cases, it is no wonder that they were
eventually leaked to the news media, specically to Seth Rosenfeld, a reporter
for the San Francisco Chronicle. Rosenfeld turned the documents over to Dr.
Norman Anderson, the chair of the November FDA panel, and Dr. Anderson
gave the documents to Commissioner Kessler.126 Commissioner Kessler found
the documents important because they provided some evidence that ocials at
Dow Corning knew that silicone tended to leak from the implants; however, the
documents did not include any studies regarding the long term eects of this
leakage on the body.127 Stern, Hopkins, and the documents are discussed in
more detail in the next section of this paper.
123See Law, supra note 88, at 46 (discussing the Hopkins case).
124See Angell, supra note 4, at 52
125See id.
126See Bernstein, supra note 96, at *473.
127See id.
30The information contained in the Dow Corning documents spurred Commis-
sioner Kessler to announce a 45-day moratorium on the use of silicone implants
on January 6, 1992.128 In February 1992, Commissioner Kessler reconvened the
advisory panel that had examined the implant safety data in November 1991
and explained in his opening remarks that new cause for concern regarding the
safety of silicone implants had surfaced.129 Although the news media placed
much emphasis on the Dow Corning documents, Commissioner Kessler listed
three sources of new information:
[f]irst, documents from manufacturer { Dow Corning {
raised questions about the adequacy of quality control,
and product testing. Second, information from clinicians
about issues involving rupture, leakage and bleeds. And
third, additional information { including reports from
rheumatologists { which have strengthened the possible
connection between breast implants and inammatory and
auto-immune disorders.130
The Commissioner tried to oset the additional panic that the moratorium
had caused by
emphasizing that the reconvening of the advisory panel did not signify that
the FDA believed the implants were unsafe.131 He claried the task of the
advisory panel by specifying two primary goals: to determine what advice to
give women who have silicone implants and to determine whether or not to lift
128See Vasey and Feldstein, supra note 119, at 85; see also Bernstein, supra note 96, at
*474.
129See Fed. News Service, FDA Advisory Panel Meeting on Breast Implants, Re-
marks by David Kessler, Feb. 18, 1992.
130Id.
131See id.
31the moratorium on the use of silicone implants.132 He further explained that:
[d]espite the emotions that this issue has aroused, the
FDA has one fundamental task: to ensure that the
implants are safe and eective. The law requires
manufacturers to provide adequate evidence that a
medical device is safe and eective. The standard for
implanted devices is not `Let the buyer beware.' The
current standard carries the armative requirement that
products must be shown to be safe. This is not the
opinion of an individual commissioner, as some would
have it. It is the law. The requirement that products must
be shown to be safe is the basis of the FDA's consumer
protection mission. It is the standard that governs what
we do.133
The Commissioner also intended these comments to combat any suggestion
that he had personal or political reasons for acting against silicone implants. He
asserted that the FDA did not oppose implants but simply wanted to get the
correct information to fully discharge its obligations under the law.134 Despite
these eorts to calm the public, the moratorium and subsequent hearings before
the FDA panel turned an already emotional atmosphere into an explosive one
in which reasonable voices were dicult to discern.135
Following the announcement of the moratorium and the FDA's decision to
reconvene the advisory panel, manufacturers and plastic surgeons immediately
made their voices heard. Representatives of Dow Corning vociferously called
for a return to science in evaluating the safety of silicone implants. In a news
conference held shortly after Commissioner Kessler's announcement of a mora-
132See id.
133Id.
134See id.
135See Bernstein, supra note 96, at *474.
32torium on the sale and use of silicone gel implants, Robert T. Rylee II, then
Vice President of Dow Corning Wright's Health Care Businesses, emphasized
Dow Corning's concerns regarding the process through which the implants came
under review.136 On behalf of Dow Corning, Rylee stated \[a] major concern is
that the debate over the safety and ecacy of breast implants be taken out of
the political arena and returned to a discussion of the true science that supports
the safety of this important medical device."137 This news conference demon-
strated that, by January 1992, Dow Corning legitimately feared that the hysteria
surrounding silicone breast implants would overshadow science and result in a
biased evaluation of the product. Rylee further emphasized Dow Corning's will-
ingness to release all of the requested documents to the FDA and claimed that
the corporation had given the FDA full access to its internal memoranda since
it was rst requested in 1988. However, he qualied these remarks by asserting
that these old memoranda did not address genuine scientic and safety issues.138
Thus, Dow Corning tried to demonstrate a cooperative attitude when faced with
the FDA's investigation of its product and tried to assert its interest in drawing
attention back to the issues important to implant recipients. However, as the
consumer groups and lawsuits had suggested, there was some evidence that the
corporation had not revealed the true extent of its knowledge regarding the leak-
age and rupture rates of its implants. As noted in the New York Law Journal
article, \Concealment of Critical Information," Dow Corning did not issue ad-
136See Fed. News Service, Further Developments Concerning Breast Implants,
Excerpts of News Conf. by Robert T. Rylee II, V.P. Dow Corning Wright Health
Care Businesses, Jan. 22, 1992.
137Id.
138See id.
33visories against the massaging of silicone implants, a practice widely believed
to reduce the formation of scar tissue but which also increased the likelihood
that the implant would rupture, until 1992.139 In addition, Dow Corning had
conducted some animal studies, which revealed potential problems with its im-
plants. As Sandra Blakeslee reported in the New York Times article, \Dow
Found Silicone Danger in 1975 Study, Lawyers Say," \[t]he study, had it been
made public in 1975, could have prevented the marketing of silicone implants by
being the rst indication that an agent in silicone gel could harm cells of the im-
mune system."140 The Dow Corning studies, at the very least, weighed in favor
of the need for additional testing of silicone breast implants and revealed what
little was actually known about their eects on the human body.141 Moreover,
adequate follow-up on the results of these early studies could have furthered the
goal of informed consent much earlier on in the development of silicone implants.
Instead, the emphasis placed on these documents by consumer groups and the
litigation, whether warranted or not, left the corporation scrambling to justify
its failure to take action regarding the documents at an earlier point in time.
The ASPRS also had much to say between the time Commissioner Kessler rst
announced the moratorium on January 6, 1992 and the FDA's next actions re-
garding silicone implants in April 1992. Dr. Norman Cole, then President of
the ASPRS, expressed concern on behalf of the ASPRS about the progression
139See Stuart A. Schlesinger, Concealment of Critical Information, N.Y.L. Journ., Mar.
18, 1992, at 3.
140Sandra Blakeslee, Dow Found Silicone Danger in 1975 Study, Lawyers Say, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 7, 1994, at A20.
141See id.
34of events surrounding silicone implants.142 He criticized the way in which the
public got access to the information about implants and stated:
[f]or ten days, patients have been confused by bits
and pieces of information that have leaked to the media.
That's outrageous. The fact that I have to tell my patients
that I can't tell you what your condition is because I haven't
read the newspaper today. I have to get my information from
the newspaper. That's my best source { bits and pieces of
information that the agency seems able to leak to the press
and cannot provide to the physicians and to the patients.143
With this comment and sharp criticism of the FDA's review process regard-
ing breast implants, Dr. Cole summed up a frustration shared by many implant
recipients and undoubtedly by some doctors: the lack of authoritative informa-
tion about the true risks associated with implants. The often-sensationalistic
media coverage of the events in the breast implant saga made it quite dicult
for women to discern the truth about their implants.
After conducting extensive hearings on the matter, the advisory panel rec-
ommended that the FDA severely limit access to silicone breast implants making
them available only for mastectomy patients and potentially to a few women for
breast augmentation studies.144 All of these women would have to agree to par-
ticipate in research studies. On April 16, 1992, Commissioner Kessler announced
the FDA's decision to accept the advisory panel's recommendation, which essen-
tially resulted in a ban on silicone implants.145 The Commissioner announced
142See Fed. News Service, News Conf. with Norman Cole, M.D., Pres. ASPRS, Jan
15, 1992.
143Id.
144See Angell, supra note 4, at 56-7.
145See id.
35the decision in a press conference and stated that the decision to limit access
to silicone implants reected the existence of too many unanswered questions
regarding their safety. Commissioner Kessler illustrated the lack safety informa-
tion by quoting one member of the advisory panel who had stated \'[w]e know
more about the life span of automobile tires than we do about the longevity of
breast implants."'146 In particular, the FDA expressed concern about the vary-
ing data regarding rupture rates and about the composition of the gel that would
leak into the body upon rupture. Commissioner Kessler cited the great discrep-
ancy between the information provided by manufacturers which indicated a.2
to 1.1 percent rupture rate and that provided by certain medical studies which
reported a four to six percent rupture rate as unacceptable.147 He explained
that the FDA could not approve the use of silicone breast implants without
satisfactory answers to basic questions regarding their safety and that the FDA
would pursue answers to those safety questions.148
In sum, the FDA lifted the total moratorium it had imposed on the use of
silicone breast implants in January 1992 and allowed their use for two very lim-
ited cases: for those in urgent need and for use in long-term clinical studies.149
The FDA developed three stages to facilitate the implementation of the April
1992 decision. Women in urgent need of the implants would have access to
them rst. This category included mastectomy patients who had already gone
through the beginning stages of breast reconstruction surgery before the Jan-
146Fed. News Service, Press Conf. with FDA Commissioner David Kessler, FDA
Decision on Availability of Breast Implants, Apr. 16, 1992.
147See id.
148See id.
149See Vasey and Feldstein, supra note 119, at 86.
36uary 1992 moratorium. That is, they had already undergone surgery to receive
a tissue expander in preparation for breast reconstruction. This group also in-
cluded women who needed new silicone implants to replace implants that had
ruptured. As a result of the total moratorium, these women had been forced
to wait to continue their procedures.150 The second stage of implementation
of the April 1992 decision involved permitting access to silicone implants to
certain women who would obtain the implants as part of a clinical study. This
group included breast cancer patients, women who had suered from a dis-
ease or trauma to the breast, and women with breast abnormalities resulting
from congenital disorders. Strangely, the FDA, in these two categories, allowed
women who were already sick either from breast cancer or from silicone leakage
continued access to the implants.151 The nal stage of implementation of the
FDA's decision involved allowing women who desired silicone implants either
for cosmetic or for reconstructive purposes to obtain the implants as part of
long-term research studies. The FDA hoped that these studies would provide a
way to track silicone implant recipients and come to some denitive conclusions
regarding their long-term safety.152
Thus, in April 1992, the FDA took long awaited action regarding silicone
implants. The agency, as a matter of law, denied \pre-market approval ap-
plications for distribution and use of these devices for cosmetic purposes or for
150See id.
151See id.
152See id at 86-7.
37augmentation of the healthy breast."153 As discussed above, it permitted the use
of silicone implants in limited cases for reconstruction and for research studies
\under the public health need extension of the application review period...."154
This exception allowed for the limited availability of a medical device to meet a
public health need. The use of silicone implants for breast augmentation, which
was permitted in the third stage of the implementation of the FDA's decision,
fell into the investigational device category contained in x215 of the FDCA.155
Women obtaining silicone implants in this manner would have to enroll in an
intensive approved research study.156 Although the FDA likely hoped to put
an end to the silicone gel implant issue with its decision, the litigation that had
begun years before the FDA took any action would continue through the 1990s.
III. The Litigation
Some important silicone implant cases such as Stern and Hopkins had al-
ready
come to trial before the FDA's 1992 decision. However, after the FDA's
announcement in 1992 the number of cases led against silicone breast implant
manufacturers rose to enormous proportions. In the two years following the
FDA's decision, implant recipients led more than 16,000 additional lawsuits
against manufacturers.157 As a result of the sheer number of lawsuits and the
often large verdicts, the silicone breast implant litigation has amounted to one
153Fed. News Service, supra note 146.
154Id.
155See Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act 21 U.S.C. x 360j (1998).
156See id.
157See Angell, supra note 4, at 69.
38of the most widely discussed and debated tort law issues in the U.S.
No discussion of silicone breast implants would be complete without a look
at the litigation, although a comprehensive review of the litigation surround-
ing the silicone breast implant controversy is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, because the early litigation played a role in drawing the attention of
the FDA to the issue of silicone implants, the following sections discuss certain
important aspects of the silicone breast implant litigation. The rst section
examines selected individual cases, and the second section examines the class
action. The third section examines the litigation in light of past and recent
scientic studies conducted to determine the safety of silicone implants.
A.
The Individual Lawsuits
1. Stern v. Dow Corning
As briey discussed earlier, Maria Stern won the rst widely publicized favorable
verdict for a silicone breast implant recipient in her lawsuit against Dow Corn-
ing.158 John Byrne, author of Informed Consent, an account of a Dow Corning
manager's personal experience with silicone implants, explains that the impor-
tance of the Stern verdict came as much from the publicity the case received as
from the actual verdict itself.159 Although other silicone implant recipients had
sued Dow Corning before Maria Stern brought her case, the corporation had
158See Angell, supra note 4, at 57.
159See John A. Byrne, Informed Consent 93 (McGraw-Hill 1996).
39settled most of these cases without much publicity. In addition, the previous
cases had alleged strict product liability claims and not that silicone implants
caused systemic illnesses.160
Maria Stern, a mastectomy patient who had received silicone implants as part
of a breast reconstruction procedure, was the rst woman to allege that her
implants had caused her to suer from a disease of the autoimmune system.
As Byrne elaborates in his book, \[s]hortly after the rupture of one of her im-
plants, she began to suer severe weight loss, hair loss, liver dysfunction, and
swelling of her lymph nodes, as well as fatigue and weakness. Granulomas {
noncancerous lumps or nodules of inammatory cells { formed where silicone
leaked into her body and combined with tissue."161 As a result of this leakage,
silicone migrated to her thyroid gland, but once doctors removed the silicone
from her body, her most severe symptoms lessened.162 Stern, believing that the
implants were the source of her problems, brought suit against Dow Corning,
the manufacturer of her implants.
Her attorneys began preparing for trial and began the process of discovery. As
mentioned earlier, it was during discovery for this case that the attorneys, specif-
ically Dan Bolton who was still a law clerk at the time, came across internal
memos that suggested that Dow Corning had some knowledge of problems with
their silicone implants. These documents included letters from plastic surgeons
reporting implant ruptures and adverse reactions by patients to the silicone that
160See id.
161Id.
162See id at 94.
40leaked into the body when an implant ruptured.163 In addition, the attorneys
relied on documents, including those publicized in later years by Public Citizen,
which relayed the results of studies on monkeys and dogs conducted by Dow
Corning that suggested potential silicone leakage problems.164
Furthermore, Stern produced a pamphlet distributed by Dow Corning to poten-
tial breast implant patients entitled \'Facts You Should Know About Your New
Look."'165 Although Dow Corning intended this pamphlet to inform patients
about the particulars of silicone implant surgery, the corporation did not in-
clude in the pamphlet information about the possibility of silicone leakage, that
the implants could rupture, or that some patients would experience enlarged
lymph nodes, scar formation or inammation as a result of leakage. It also
omitted information about common side eects associated with silicone such as
capsular contracture.166 These omissions made it dicult for Dow Corning to
rebut Stern's claim that she had not agreed to the procedure in a situation of
informed consent.
The jury found in favor of Stern and awarded her $211,000 in compensatory
damages and $1.5 million in punitive damages.167 They found that Dow Corn-
ing had sold a defective product, that the product had caused Stern harm, and
that Dow Corning had knowingly sold a harmful product.168 Dow Corning
appealed, lost its rst appeal, appealed again, and eventually settled the case
163See id at 98.
164See id at 99.
165See id at 101.
166See id.
167See id at 105.
168See id; see also Angell, supra note 4, at 112.
41before the second appeal was decided. As part of the settlement, information
regarding the case was placed under seal, and expert witnesses who had testied
in the case were forbidden from discussing the case.169 Despite these measures,
the Stern verdict already had done its damage. Not only did the documents
eventually fall into the hands of consumer groups and the FDA advisory panel,
but also implant recipients had seen that they could pursue successful and prof-
itable lawsuits against the implant manufacturers.170
2. Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp.
The next important silicone breast implant case was Hopkins v. Dow Corn-
ing
Corp. and was decided shortly after the November 1991 FDA advisory
panel began its work.171 As Angell explains \[i]n its own way, this case was
even more inuential than the Stern case, because it was instrumental in the
FDA ban."172 Like Stern, Mariann Hopkins was a mastectomy patient who had
had her breasts removed because she suered from brocystic disease of the
breast. She obtained silicone implants manufactured by Dow Corning as part
of a breast reconstruction procedure, but one of her implants ruptured a short
time after the surgery. Following the rupture, she had both implants replaced
to ensure that her breasts would continue to be symmetrical. Three years after
the second procedure Hopkins developed mixed connective tissue disease, an
169See Zimmerman, supra note 41, at 32.
170See Zimmerman, supra note 41, at 33; see also Angell, supra note 4, at 111.
171See Zimmerman, supra note 41, at 35; see also Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F. 3d
1116, *1118 (9th Cir. 1994).
172Angell, supra note 4, at 118.
42incurable autoimmune disorder that often produces debilitating symptoms such
as systemic lupus, rheumatoid arthritis, and scleroderma.173 Despite eorts to
treat her disease, her symptoms remained severe, and Hopkins gave up her job
seven years after the initial diagnosis.174
That same year, one of Hopkins implants ruptured, and she had them both
replaced for the second time. Around this time, Hopkins saw a television report
on the dangers of silicone implants and began to think that her implants had
caused her illness.175 She contacted Dan Bolton, who had been instrumental
in winning the Stern case, to initiate a lawsuit against Dow Corning. As the
case went to trial, it became clear that Bolton again had a sympathetic plain-
ti. She had received silicone implants for reconstructive rather than cosmetic
purposes and obviously had suered from her illness. However, even more so
than in the Stern case, the link between her implants and her illness remained
tenuous throughout the trial.176 The plainti called many experts to testify to a
connection between her implants and her illness, but as Angell notes \[n]one of
Bolton's witnesses was an epidemiologist. Yet this is the only kind of specialist
who could actively speak to the issue of a possible link between breast implants
and connective tissue disease."177 Furthermore, two of Hopkins personal doc-
tors testied that she had exhibited some symptoms of her illness before she
ever had breast implant surgery.178
173See Angell, supra note 4, at 117-18.
174See Angell, supra note 4, at 118.
175See Hopkins, 33 F.3d at *1118-19.
176See Byrne, supra note 159, at 167; see also Angell, supra note 4, at 120-21.
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43In fact, a later case also questioned the Hopkins decision. Hall v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, *1414 (Dist. Ct. Or. 1996), involved
the admissibility of expert testimony in a breast implant case against Baxter
Healthcare.179 The evidence in question included testimony as to the scientic
link between silicone implants and systemic disease. In holding the evidence re-
garding causation inadmissible, the court distinguished Hopkins by stating that
the Ninth Circuit in Hopkins had not adequately investigated the methodology
relied on by the plainti's experts. Furthermore, the court in Hall questioned
exactly how the experts in Hopkins had established a causal connection between
the silicone implants and the plainti's symptoms.180
Despite the questionable link between Hopkins' symptoms and her silicone
gel implants, the jury found Dow Corning guilty of fraud and malice and awarded
her $7.3 million.181 Dow Corning appealed arguing that Hopkins' lawsuit was
barred by the statute of limitations and that the testimony at trial had not
demonstrated that it was more likely than not that Hopkins' implants had
caused her illness. The corporation challenged the qualications of the plainti's
experts and asserted that their studies had not shown a causal connection to
the necessary level of certainty.182 Nevertheless, in an opinion delivered by
Judge Proctor Hug on August 24, 1994, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit armed the jury's verdict. The court concluded that the statute of
179See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, *1414 n. 50 (Dist. Ct. Or.
1996).
180See id.
181See Hopkins, 33 F.3d. at *1126.
182See Angell, supra note 4, at 124.
44limitations did not bar Hopkins' case as it only began to toll after 1987 when
she knew or should have known that she had been harmed by the implants
and that Hopkins' experts had met the requirements established in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 597-8 (1993) for giving an expert
opinion.183 The ninth circuit interpreted Daubert as requiring only that an
expert base his testimony on scientic knowledge that could assist the fact-
nder and not necessarily on a generally accepted methodology.184 However, as
discussed above, later cases such as Hall became more likely to exclude scientic
evidence by relying on Daubert's discussion of the court's gatekeeping role.185
As for the evidence presented by Hopkins' experts, Circuit Judge Hug wrote:
[t]he evidence presented at trial established that a large
number of Dow silicone gel breast implants had been
implanted in thousands of women. Each of these women
was at risk of encountering the same fate from which
Hopkins suered. Therefore, Dow's conduct in exposing
thousands of women to a painful and debilitating disease,
and the evidence that Dow gained nancially from its
conduct, may properly be considered in imposing an
award of punitive damages. Moreover, given the facts
that Dow was aware of possible defects in its implants,
that Dow knew long-term studies of the implants' safety
were needed, that Dow concealed this information as well
as the negative results of the few short-term laboratory tests
performed, and that Dow continued for several years to
market its implants as safe despite this knowledge, a
substantial punitive damages award is justied.186
Thus, the court emphasized the Dow Corning internal documents and studies
183See Hopkins, 33 F.3d at *1123-25 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 33
F.3d 1116 (1993)).
184See id at *1124-25.
185See Hall, 947 F. Supp. at *1414.
186Hopkins, 33 F. 3d at *1127.
45in its decision to uphold the jury verdict. Despite the scarcity of long-term
studies and the uncertain application of Dow Corning's animal studies to the
use of silicone implants in humans, Dow Corning again found itself defeated in
a breast implant case. In fact, as Circuit Judge Hug's opinion indicates, Dow
Corning seemed to lose almost as much based on the studies it had conducted
as based on the studies it had failed to conduct. That is, the jury and the court
of appeals seemed to fault Dow Corning for marketing (and proting from) a
product without rst conducting adequate safety tests.187 Dow Corning stopped
making silicone implants shortly after the Hopkins verdict.188
3. Johnson v. Bristol Myers Squibb Co.
The FDA's April 1992 announcement of its decision to allow the use of sil-
icone implants only in strictly limited cases did nothing to stem the litigation
tide. In fact, one of the rst silicone implant cases decided after the announce-
ment resulted in a $25 million award to Pamela Johnson. Johnson, unlike Stern
and Hopkins, received silicone implants as part of a breast augmentation pro-
cedure. She had no problems with her implants until nearly 13 years after the
procedure when she began to experience hardening of her breasts.189 Johnson
visited her plastic surgeon to nd relief from the hardening, and her surgeon
performed a closed capsulotomy to reduce the hardening of the breast. As dis-
cussed earlier, many surgeons performed this procedure to break up hard scar
187See id.
188See Angell, supra note 4, at 123.
189See id at 134 (discussing Johnson v. Bristol Myers Squibb Co., No. 91-21770 (S.D.Tex.
1992).
46tissue that often formed around the implant, but the practice fell out of favor
in the 1980s because it tended to cause the implant to rupture.190 Johnson's
implants ruptured shortly after her surgeon performed the closed capsulotomy,
and she had to return to her surgeon to have the implants replaced. She eventu-
ally consulted another plastic surgeon because she did not like the appearance
of her new implants. The second surgeon replaced the implants again, but a
few years later Johnson had these implants removed as well.191
Johnson had sought to have the second set of implants removed after she began
to suer from fatigue and u like symptoms. She brought suit against Medical
Engineering Corporation, a subsidiary of Bristol-Myers Squibb, alleging that her
implants had caused her illness.192 However, no doctor had diagnosed Johnson
with any specic immune or connective tissue disorder, making her case even
more dicult to demonstrate than Hopkins' case.193 In addition, she was a less
sympathetic plainti because she had received her implants for cosmetic reasons
instead of for breast reconstruction, she smoked, and her plastic surgeon had
performed a procedure known to increase rupture rates.194 However, despite her
plastic surgeons error, the manufacturer was still the most appealing defendant.
It was a large corporation with deep pockets and so could meet any verdict or
settlement, and like Dow Corning, it had its own set of incriminating internal
documents. The plainti used these documents to portray the manufacturer as
190See id at 135.
191See id.
192See id.
193See id at 134.
194See Bernstein, supra note 96, at *478.
47a corporation interested only in prots no matter what the costs.195
Johnson's attorneys also made some use of her assorted symptoms and es-
sentially rested the case on the possibility that Johnson could become sick in the
future. Her attorneys focused on \all the other women with breast implants"
and \suggested that Johnson was somehow a proxy for all these other women,
all of whom shared fears engendered by the implants...."196 That is, because
of the great panic surrounding silicone breast implants, Johnson would have to
live in fear of developing a serious disease. In addition, the attorneys subtly
shifted the burden of proof to the defendants by emphasizing that neither MEC
nor Bristol Myers Squibb had bothered to conduct adequate safety tests of their
products.197 As Bernstein explains, the plainti's attorneys \repeatedly asked
the jury to hold the MEC and its parent Bristol Myers Squibb liable unless they
could prove that they knew that breast implants were safe when they marketed
them."198 Thus, as in Hopkins, the corporation in Johnson had to combat the
notion that it had failed to fulll its duty to ensure its product's safety even
though the scientic evidence did not provide a strong foundation for the plain-
ti's claim. Unfortunately for MEC and Bristol Myers Squibb, the jury awarded
Johnson $25 million despite the limited scientic support for her claim.199
4. Dow Chemical v. Mahlum
Breast implant plaintis have also sued Dow Corning's parent company, Dow
195See id.
196Angell, supra note 4, at 135.
197See Bernstein, supra note 96, at *479.
198Id. at *479.
199See id.
48Chemical Corporation. As explained by Michelle Kohlmeier her article, \Mal-
practice & Negligence: Negligent Undertaking Liability for Silicone Testing {
Dow Chemical Co. v. Mahlum," Charlotte Mahlum underwent silicone implant
surgery as part of a breast reconstruction procedure.200 A few years after the
surgery, her implants began to leak silicone into her body, and she began to ex-
perience symptoms of atypical autoimmune disease. Alleging that the silicone
implants produced by Dow Corning had caused her illness, she led suit against
Dow Corning and Dow Chemical for fraud and negligence in connection with
the manufacture of silicone gel breast implants.201 She based her claim against
Dow Chemical on the fact that, as Dow Corning's parent, Dow Chemical owned
50% of the subsidiary and had conducted studies on silicone for its subsidiary
for thirty years. Thus, although Dow Chemical had delegated the manufacture
of the implants to its subsidiary, Mahlum felt that the parent still bore some of
the responsibility for her injuries.202
The claims against Dow Corning were severed, and a Nevada jury found in
favor of the plainti in her case against Dow Chemical. Dow Chemical ap-
pealed.203 In late 1998, the Nevada Supreme Court upheld the jury's verdict,
which awarded the plainti $38,654 for past damages and $3,915,000 for fu-
ture damages. However, it vacated the jury's award of $10,000,000 for punitive
damages citing inadequate evidence to support the allegations of fraud.204 The
200See Michelle Kohlmeier, Malpractice & Negligence: Negligent Undertaking Liability for
Silicone Testing { Dow Chemical Co. v. Mahlum, 25 Am J.L. & Med. *180 (1999).
201See Dow Chemical Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98, *103 (Sup. Ct. Nev. 1998).
202See Kohlmeier, supra note 200, at *180.
203See Mahlum, 970 P.2d at *106, *124.
204See id.
49court reasoned that the plaintis needed to present evidence to demonstrate
that Dow Corning was negligent or marketed unsafe products and then needed
to show that Dow Chemical was liable as well.205 Once it upheld the jury's
verdict for the plainti on the negligence claims, the court also found that the
jury had properly held Dow Chemical liable for Mahlum's injuries because the
parent had negligently performed services it had agreed to provide and which
were necessary for the protection of third parties. The parent and its subsidiary
had exchanged signicant information regarding the safety of breast implants,
and Dow Chemical had accepted a duty to completely test the safety of sili-
cone.206 Moreover, Dow Chemical owned 50% of Dow Corning and held seats
on the subsidiary's Board of Directors. Thus, the parent exerted a signicant
amount of control over its subsidiary and could have inuenced the subsidiary's
marketing of the implants.207 This corporate structure led the court to nd that
the parent had an obligation to consumers to adequately test the implants and
to ensure that its subsidiary behaved responsibly. Dow Chemical failed to fulll
its responsibility to test the implants and failed to exert its inuence to prevent
Dow Corning's marketing of a potentially unsafe product. Therefore, the jury
properly held it liable for negligence in marketing an inadequately tested prod-
uct.208
However, before holding Dow Chemical liable, the plainti needed to demon-
strate that Dow Corning had negligently marketed an unsafe product and estab-
205See id at *107.
206See Kohlmeier, supra note 200, at *180.
207See id.
208See id.
50lish causation between that product and her illness.209 In fact, the discussion
of causation in Mahlum v. Dow Chemical, 970 P.2d 98, *106 (Sup. Ct. Nev.
1998), is even more interesting than the issue of the liability of the parent
corporation because the court in Mahlum clearly elaborated the standard for
causation in breast implant cases. The court noted that Mahlum had presented
evidence demonstrating a chronology of events that seemed to indicate that her
illness had started and worsened from the time she received her implants to
the time the implants ruptured. There was also expert testimony on whether
the implants caused the injuries. Based on this evidence, the jury concluded
that Mahlum not have become ill was it not for her silicone breast implants.210
The Nevada Supreme Court upheld this nding and found that the plaintis
had adequately established causation. The court further noted that Mahlum's
case \was not tried in the court of scientic opinion, but before a jury of her
peers who considered the evidence and concluded that Dow Corning silicone
gel breast implants caused her injuries. The jury in this case was properly in-
structed to consider the proof by a preponderance of the evidence."211 That
is, the court emphasized that consensus in the scientic community regarding
causation was not necessary for the jurors to reach an appropriate verdict.212
This discussion of causation is important to understanding the breast implant
cases because the court made explicit the level of evidence necessary for a breast
implant plainti to prove causation and in this way addressed those critics of
209See Mahlum, 970 P.2d at *106, *124.
210See id.
211Id at *109
212See id.
51the breast implant litigation who had questioned the scientic basis of the ver-
dicts. A plainti need not show to scientic certainty that the implants caused
the illness to prevail in a claim against a breast implant manufacturer. Rather,
\[s]cience may properly require a higher standard of proof before declaring the
truth," but that higher standard is not necessary for a jury to nd in favor of
a breast implant plainti.213 The plainti demonstrated causation to the legal
standard of a preponderance of the evidence, though not necessarily to the level
of scientic certainty. In addition, Dow Corning and Dow Chemical should have
foreseen that the silicone could injure women and failed to adequately test the
product's safety.214
B. The Class Action
Faced with an overwhelming number of claims against them and enormous
potential liability, Dow Corning, Bristol Myers Squibb, Baxter International,
and Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company (3M), the four major sil-
icone breast implant manufacturers, agreed to a consolidated settlement of the
federal class action in 1994.215 This settlement followed the 1992 certication
of a class action lawsuit against the silicone implant manufacturers by the Judi-
cial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.216 The class action proceeded under the
supervision of Alabama federal judge Samuel Pointer, who promptly appointed
a 17-member committee to negotiate a settlement between the manufacturers
213See id at *109.
214See id.
215See Bernstein, supra note 96, at *479-80.
216See Angell, supra note 4, at 79.
52and the thousands of women alleging injuries resulting from their silicone im-
plants.217
According to the 1994 agreement, the manufacturers agreed to set aside $4.25
billion for the settlement of the claims of all women who had received silicone
implants. Implant recipients could qualify to take part in the settlement if they
currently had or developed symptoms of connective tissue disease within 30
years of implant surgery that appeared or worsened after implant surgery. The
settlement required women claiming a current disease to provide medical doc-
umentation of their illness, either in the form of medical records or a doctor's
diagnosis. Once a woman qualied for the settlement, the type of disease, its
severity, and the woman's age at the onset of the disease would determine the
amount of money she would receive. Breast implant recipients could also receive
money for emotional distress and uninsured medical expenses arising from sili-
cone implants. Finally, spouses and children born before April 1994 could make
emotional distress claims to receive compensation under the settlement.218
However, the settlement agreement permitted women to opt out to pursue indi-
vidual lawsuits and provided a lower amount of compensation for each claimant
as more women joined the settlement.219 As more and more women came for-
ward to take part in the settlement, the amount of money guaranteed to each
woman declined signicantly. These two aspects of the agreement combined
with the precedents for large individual verdicts led many women to opt out of
the agreement and pursue individual actions against the manufacturers. Fur-
217See id.
218See id at 80-1.
219See id at 82.
53thermore, in 1995, a year after the announcement of the agreement, the man-
ufacturers declared that they could not meet the agreement's nancial require-
ments. The nal event to cause the settlement to fall apart was Dow Corning's
declaration of bankruptcy in 1995.220
Despite these setbacks, Bristol Myers Squibb, Baxter International, and 3M ar-
rived at another settlement agreement toward the end of 1995. As explained by
Apryl A. Ference in her article, \Rushing to Judgment on Fen-Phen and Re-
dux: Were the FDA, Drug Manufacturers, and Doctors too Quick to Respond
to Americans' Infatuation with a Cure-All Diet Pill," this agreement provided
breast implant recipients with a much lower amount of compensation than the
earlier agreement.221 It also provided that they could receive a xed amount
based on their current symptoms or a greater amount if they waited to see if
they developed symptoms in the future. The rst group of women would re-
ceive between $10,000 and $100,000, and the second group could qualify for
$75,000 to $250,000 depending on the severity of the disease they developed.222
As a result of its bankruptcy proceedings, Dow Corning did not participate in
this settlement; however, it also reached a settlement with the breast implant
recipients through proceedings in bankruptcy court.
Dow Corning's settlement, announced in 1997, set aside $2.4 billion for those
suering from silicone-induced illnesses. According to the agreement, Dow Corn-
220See id at 192.
221See Apryl A. Ference, Rushing to Judgment on Fen-Phen and Redux: Were the FDA,
Drug Manufacturers, and Doctors too Quick to Respond to Americans' Infatuation with a
Cure-All Diet Pill for Weight Loss, 9 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 77, *98-9 (1998).
222See id.
54ing would provide between $650 and $250,000 to compensate breast implant re-
cipients based on the severity of their symptoms and would provide up to $8,000
to compensate women for expenses associated with the removal of ruptured im-
plants.223 As reported in \The Washington Post," the nal agreement, approved
in December 1999, provided $3.2 billion for women claiming to suer illnesses
because of their silicone implants. The terms of the settlement allowed silicone
implant recipients to receive compensation depending on the level of their in-
jury.224 Those suering from lumping and scarring could collect $30,000, and
those with more severe symptoms could collect up to $300,000. Women could
still opt out of the settlement to sue Dow Corning individually; however, the
terms of the agreement prohibited women who opted out of the settlement from
receiving punitive damages from Dow Corning and from suing Dow Corning's
parent company. In addition, Dow Corning could demand a separate trial in the
individual lawsuits to establish the scientic connections between the implants
and the illnesses.225 Thus, the nal settlement reected the uncertainty of the
causal link between silicone implants and disease that plaintis' attorneys had
previously glossed over during individual lawsuits.
223See id.
224See Closing the Implants File, Wash Post, Dec. 9, 1999, at A44.
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55C. A Look at the Scientic Studies of Silicone Implants
Although most studies conducted by both manufacturers and independent re-
search groups have not found a signicant connection between silicone implants
and the most severe symptoms experienced by implant recipients, consumer
groups and women's advocates continue to question the validity of these stud-
ies. As a result of this constant speculation about the results of the studies, it is
dicult to discern which studies provide the most valid result, and it is unlikely
that the public will ever clearly know the extent of the actual link between
silicone implants and disease.
The rst two major studies of the long-term eects of silicone implants on
women's health published in 1994 and 1995 in the New England Journal of
Medicine showed no link between the implants and disease.226 As explained in
the FDA Consumer, the study published in 1994 and conducted by the pres-
tigious Mayo Clinic compared the health of 749 residents of Olmsted County,
Minnesota with silicone implants with a comparable group of women without
implants. The study published in 1995, known as the Harvard Nurses' Study,
tracked the health of over 87,000 nurses, some without implants and some with
implants, from 1976 through 1990. Although some of the participants in these
studies did develop connective tissue diseases, the researchers concluded that
there was not a signicant connection between silicone implants and the dis-
eases.227
226See Law, supra note 88, at 48.
227See Marian Segal, A Status Report on Breast Implant Safety (visited Feb. 26, 2000)
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56Consumer advocates immediately criticized these studies as unreliable based
on the number of participants in the study and the inclusion of women who had
received their implants only a few years prior to participating in the study.
They emphasized that many of the autoimmune symptoms would not even sur-
face for eight to fteen years after the insertion of the implants and that the
studies should have allowed more time to elapse before following up on the par-
ticipants. In addition, critics of the studies questioned their impartiality because
they had relied on plastic surgeons for part of their funding.228 Thus, despite
initial scientic results that should have reassured women about their implants,
immediate and well-publicized criticism of the studies served to eliminate any
reassurance that the results may have generated.229
Subsequent studies conducted by SBI Laboratories and by a Harvard Uni-
versity
doctor in 1995 and 1996 respectively showed a small link between silicone im-
plants and a distinct autoimmune prole. As reported in the PR Newswire, the
SBI study followed 600 women and found that women with silicone implants ex-
hibited a distinct autoimmune prole previously undetectable using traditional
rheumatological tests.230 The study used a new test called the \Detecsil" test to
identify antibodies, which form in response to proteins developed by the human
body in response to silicone exposure.231 However, silicone implant manufac-
228See Law, supra note 88, at 48.
229See id.
230See SBI Laboratories: Silicone Breast Implants Cause Autoimmune Disease, PR
Newswire, May 15, 1995.
231See id.
57turers and supporters quickly emphasized problems with the accuracy of this
study. Most of the criticism surrounding the study focused on the fact that Dr.
Nir Kossovsky had funded the study and developed the test. Dr. Kossovsky
had founded SBI to facilitate the development and use of the Detecsil test. In
addition, he had advertised his test in lawyers' magazines as a way to diagnosis
diseases caused by silicone. In fact, his test could identify certain antibodies
but could not diagnosis silicone related illnesses. These misstatements caused
the FDA to inform Dr. Kossovsky that he had failed to comply with federal
regulations by misbranding his test.232 Thus, questions about the reliability
of the study ensured that its results did little to settle the issue of silicone's
causation of disease.
Despite questionable early studies, later and more comprehensive studies pro-
vided more support for the manufacturers contention that there was no signi-
cant link between silicone implants and disease. First, in July 1998, The Lancet,
one of the most prestigious British medical journals, reported the results of
a study conducted by the UK Independent Review Group on Silicone Gel
Breast Implants (IRG).233 This study found no \epidemiological evidence of
a link between silicone gel breast implants and abnormal immune responses or
connective-tissue disease."234 The IRG enumerated its ndings in The Lancet
and explained that:
silicone breast implants are not associated with any
greater health risk than other surgical implants; if there is
232See Angell, supra note 4, at 152.
233See Marie-Clare McMenemy, UK Review Group Gives Silicone Implants All Clear, The
Lancet, July 18, 1998.
234Id.
58any risk of connective tissue disease it is too small to be
quantied; further epidemiological studies are not justied;
the incidence of ill health in women implanted with silicone
gel is no greater than the general population; and children of
these women are not at increased risk of connective-tissue
disease.235
These ndings seemed to address many of the concerns expressed by the
FDA about earlier studies. As the IRG explained in its report on silicone breast
implants, it sorted through an enormous amount of old and new information
and was made up of a group of experts chosen for their independence. It also
addressed the issues of rupture and leakage.236 Thus, the study was not open
to many of the criticisms leveled at earlier studies. Moreover, its ndings, when
considered in light of the thousands of claims alleging that silicone implants had
caused a variety of diseases, were quite startling.
The second major study of silicone implants was released less than a year
after that of the IRG. As reported in the Mass Tort Litigation Reporter, in June
1999 the Institute of Medicine (IOM) released a study that revealed no connec-
tion between silicone breast implants and disease.237 The IOM panelists had
examined the claims of more than a thousand women and reviewed thousands
of publications dealing with silicone implants before arriving their conclusion.
In addition, the IOM report conrmed the results of the study conducted by the
panel appointed by Judge Pointer during the multi-district settlement negotia-
235Id.
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59tions and the ndings of the study conducted by the IRG's British scientists.238
Although the IOM is a branch of the National Academy of Sciences, which is
the most prestigious scientic organization in the United States, consumer ad-
vocates still found fault with the results.239
In fact, it is possible to nd fault with almost any study, and critics may be
correct in asserting that the studies did not follow enough implant recipients to
come to a totally certain conclusion. It is also possible to argue that despite
the lack of scientic studies supporting their claims the plaintis in the silicone
implant cases made an adequate case for holding the manufacturers at least par-
tially liable for their injuries. The plaintis had provided some evidence to sup-
port their claims such as testimony from reputable doctors who had observed a
correlation between illness and implants, testimony that the manufacturers had
not adequately tested their products, and testimony that the manufacturers
also intentionally concealed the fact that their implants could leak.240 However,
this evidence may not have warranted the amount of damages assessed to the
defendants, and the verdicts certainly should not have been viewed as resting
on studies that demonstrated causation to any scientic certainty. Moreover,
later studies, despite being subject to criticism and despite the verdicts in the
litigation, have at least shown that any potential correlation between silicone
implants and the most severe symptoms claimed by implant recipients is not as
common as the events of silicone implant controversy would suggest.241 In fact,
238See id.
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60some more recent cases against breast implant manufacturers such as Allison
v. McGhan Medical Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, *1315 (11th Cir. 1999), have relied
on the results of these studies nding no causal link between silicone implants
and systemic disease to exclude expert testimony seeking to demonstrate oth-
erwise.242
IV.
An Assessment of the Silicone Implant Regulation
Throughout the silicone implant saga, the manufacturers and the plastic
surgeons performing the breast implant surgery stood in a relatively similar po-
sition with respect to the women deciding to undergo the procedures. That is,
they both had a direct nancial interest in encouraging women to choose silicone
breast augmentation surgery.243 Although Dow Corning, and some of the other
manufacturers had conducted limited testing of their product, they failed to
follow up on those studies with larger studies of the eects of silicone implants
as used in the human body.244 The manufacturers may not have wanted to
invest resources in further study, may have feared the results of further stud-
ies would force them to halt their manufacture of a very protable product, or
may have feared the studies would indicate a need for additional warnings to
prospective patients and reduce the number of women choosing implants. Re-
gardless of their motives for not conducting more tests on the safety of their
242See Allison v. McGhan Medical Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, *1315 (11th Cir. 1999).
243See Spanbauer, supra note 35, *191.
244See Bernstein, supra note 96, at *485.
61product, the fact remains that they proted immensely from the manufacture
and sale of silicone breast implants for over thirty years and ignored some indi-
cations that further study of their product was needed. Moreover, there is some
evidence that manufacturers, prior to 1992, did not indicate in their advertise-
ments a complete list of the risks associated with silicone implants nor did they
include a statement that they had not conducted long-term studies regarding
the implants' safety.245 As Spanbauer argues, \[a]t a minimum, women who
were contemplating surgery should have been told what kind of testing had, or
in this case, had not been done, so that they could have made a meaningful
choice about whether to assume the long-term risks and uncertainties of breast
implants."246 Thus, as argued by Rebecca Weisman in her article, \Reforms in
Medical Device Regulation: An Examination of the Silicone Gel Breast Implant
Debacle," the manufacturers played a large part in creating the illusion that
breast augmentation procedures had few risks.247
Many plastic surgeons, also largely interested in the bottom line, did little to
correct this illusion. As discussed earlier, the ASPRS, a group to which 90% of
the plastic surgeons in America belong, conducted a costly publicity campaign
to promote breast augmentation procedures and to suggest that an increase in
breast size would also increase a woman's self-esteem.248 Moreover, plastic sur-
geons also often occupy a fundamentally dierent position with respect to their
patients than do other types of physicians. That is, the plastic surgeon's prof-
245See Spanbauer, supra note 35, at *193.
246Id.
247See Rebecca Weisman, Reforms in Medical Device Regulation: An Examination of the
Silicone Gel Breast Implant Debacle, 23 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 973, *988.
248See Spanbauer, supra note 35, at *182.
62its depend largely on treating patients who have no real medical need for the
surgeon's services. As a result of this relationship between the plastic surgeon
and the patient, the surgeon's interests may not always coincide with the best
interest of the patient. Unlike an internist or a cardiologist who must provide
complete information so that a patient can choose between competing medical
procedures, a plastic surgeon may not have an incentive to provide a patient
with the worst case scenario as that information may cause the patient to de-
cide against the procedure.249 Furthermore, as Loane Skene explains, \many
people seeking cosmetic surgery have such a picture `in their mind's eye' of how
they will appear after the surgery" and \this may override the caution of a
`reasonable person' in considering risks associated with the surgery."250 Thus,
although plastic surgeons may have needed to confront patients with the worst
case scenario in order to ensure that the patient appreciated the true risks of
the procedure, they did not necessarily have a nancial interest in providing this
information.251 This is not to say that all plastic surgeons performing silicone
breast implant surgery encouraged their patients to undergo a risky procedure
without any concern for the patients' health. Moreover, the surgeons themselves
may not have had complete information from the manufacturer regarding the
risks of the silicone implants.252 However, the nature of plastic surgery and the
actions of the ASPRS do suggest that the plastic surgeons played a large role
in selling women on the benets of breast augmentation without including a
249See id at *194.
250See Skene, supra note 52, at *2.
251See id at *27.
252See Vasey and Feldstein, supra note 119, at 93.
63corresponding emphasis on the risks.253
As the above discussions indicate, it is a matter of economic reality that in
a competitive society concern for prots will play a critical role in determin-
ing corporate and individual behavior. For this reason, government regulatory
agencies, in this case the FDA, play a critical role in ensuring that concern for
prot does not overcome consumer safety. In the case of silicone implants, pow-
erful forces such as manufacturers' interest in prots, physicians' disincentive
to portray the worst case scenario, and the media's pervasive portrayal of an
unrealistic body image combined to heighten the need for regulation.254 Nev-
ertheless, the FDA did not use the power given it under the Medical Device
Amendments in 1976 to request safety information from the manufacturers of
silicone implants for over ten years. Angell asserts that this lax regulation is
evidence of the dicult balance the FDA must maintain between permitting
choice and protecting consumers and questions the rationality of the FDA's
1992 decision to strictly limit the use of silicone implants.255 She argues that
the FDA primarily exists to ll in the information gap between consumers and
manufacturers so that the consumer is in a better position to make a choice. As
the FDA did not know much more about the risks of silicone implants than did
consumers, Angell questions the basis of the FDA's 1992 decision. She explains
the decision as based on the judgement that the FDA should tolerate very little
risk in products where the benets are merely cosmetic and asserts that \[i]n
253See Spanbauer, supra note 32, at *182.
254See Weisman, supra note 247, at *987.
255See Angell, supra note 4, at 62-4.
64waving aside the benets of breast implants for most women who had them,
Kessler seemed to be introducing an impossible high standard for the devices:
since there were no benets, there should be no risks."256
However, the FDA's 1992 decision is open to another interpretation, one ad-
vanced by Commissioner Kessler in his April 1992 press conference. That is the
interpretation that the FDA's regulation of silicone implants would draw out
much needed information about their eects on the body. Even if the evidence
linking silicone implants to the more serious diseases alleged by the implant
recipients was weak, there was still a substantial lack of information regard-
ing rupture rates, leakage, and the less chronic eects of silicone when released
into the body.257 Studies were necessary to answer these questions, and at the
time of the 1992 decision, more studies regarding the correlation between sys-
temic diseases and silicone implants were still needed. Thus, although the FDA
did not have much more information than consumers did on which to base its
decision, it was in the best position to ensure that more information came to
light. After all, the 1976 Medical Device Amendments required manufacturers
to provide evidence of the safety of their products so that the FDA could prop-
erly evaluate that product. These amendments responded to serious concerns
regarding the safety of medical devices, and the FDA simply fullled its role
as a consumer protection agency by limiting access to silicone implants until
manufacturers complied with the information requirement. Any fault assessed
to the FDA should be that it waited too long before taking action with regard
256Id at 63.
257See Fed. News Service, supra note 146.
65to a medical device used by millions of women. As a result of the delay, the
FDA's decision seemed more like a response to popular pressure than a result
of a desire to properly carry out its mandate under the MDA.
V.
Lessons for the Future
As the above analysis of the silicone implant controversy reveals, the inter-
action
of three groups largely controlled the direction of the debate leading to reg-
ulation: those responsible for promoting the devices (manufacturers and plastic
surgeons), the tort system and the FDA. All three groups can learn lessons from
the silicone implant story.
The IRG, in its report on silicone gel breast implants, made sensible suggestions
to counteract the possibly biased inuences of those promoting breast implants.
As summarized in The Lancet, the IRG suggested providing all patients un-
dergoing cosmetic breast surgery with full access to information detailing the
benets and risks of surgery and having a waiting period between consultation
and operation.258 A group designated to providing this information would do so
free of charge, and all advertisements encouraging breast augmentation would
direct women to this group to obtain more information. However, manufac-
turers would not be permitted to contact women considering implant surgery
258See McMenemy, supra note 233.
66directly.259 Moreover, plastic surgeons would provide women considering breast
augmentation surgery with an opportunity to fully discuss the risks of the pro-
cedure and the nancial implications of any future procedures that may be
necessary. They would also refund any deposits if the potential implant recipi-
ent had a change of heart.260 To ensure that the plastic surgeons provided the
women with full information, a woman deciding to undergo breast augmentation
would have to sign a consent form certifying that the surgeon has addressed all
of her concerns. In addition, the private plastic surgeons would have to adhere
to proper standards of care for follow up procedures and report all adverse ef-
fects associated with the implants to the appropriate agency. A national breast
implant registry would keep track of breast implant procedures and a steering
group would be established to monitor further research in the area.261
Some of these suggestions such as the national registry and the use of consent
forms have already been implemented. The suggestions generally would require
that manufacturers and physicians take some responsibility for ensuring that
the woman considering the implant procedure appreciates the seriousness of her
decision and is not swayed by other forces into thinking that cosmetic surgery is
a low-risk procedure. In this way, they address the concerns of some commen-
tators that women may develop an idealized vision of what the procedure will
accomplish for their appearance and may not fully weigh the associated risks
unless presented with a worst case scenario.262 However, given the number of
259See IRG Report, supra note 236.
260See id.
261See id.
262See Skene, supra note 52, at *27.
67surgeons performing cosmetic surgery and the number of breast augmentation
procedures performed each year, it may be dicult to enforce some of these
requirements, particularly the monitoring of information conveyed in oce con-
sultations. It seems that plastic surgeons would have to be convinced that
following these suggestions would benet them individually in order to reach a
high level of compliance.
The precedent for enormous jury verdicts established by some of the breast
implant cases has demonstrated the power of the tort system to compel behavior
from otherwise non-compliant actors. As prots likely drove manufacturers and
plastic surgeons to behave in a less than prudent way when it came to selling
implant surgery, the threat of large monetary liability is also a way to encour-
age responsible corporate and individual behavior. Some commentators, such
as Angell, have strongly criticized the breast implant verdicts as not founded on
science. They suggest various reforms such as expanded use of court appointed
experts and scientic panels to help courts decide the issue of causation.263
However, although at the time of many of the breast implant trials the scientic
evidence supporting the plaintis was weak, there was stronger evidence that
manufacturers had not done what they should have to investigate the safety of
their product. In addition, as the Nevada Supreme Court explained in Mahlum,
the legal standard applicable to the breast implant cases required only a pre-
ponderance of the evidence and not a showing of causation to a scientic cer-
263See Law, supra note 88, at 73.
68tainty.264 In fact, it may not be wise to require such a high burden of plaintis
who bring claims such as those brought by the breast implant recipients. A
requirement of scientic certainty would impose an incredibly high standard on
plaintis who might not have the resources to pursue such claims. Such a high
standard would likely greatly reduce an important role of the tort system { de-
terrence. That is, regardless of the standard required to establish causation, the
lesson manufacturers can take away from the breast implant story is that even
if they escape regulation, the tort system is an equally important deterrent to
corporate misbehavior.265
Perhaps the largest lesson revealed by the breast implant story is that the
FDA plays a vital role in assuring public safety and responsible corporate be-
havior. This lesson is particularly important in light of the sharp criticisms
that followed the breast implant decision. These criticisms included fears that,
in the wake of the breast implant debacle, companies, fearing immense liabil-
ity, would cease to create new products. For example, the Chicago Tribune
reported on March 13, 1995 that \[t]he safety debate over breast implants has
spawned a legal controversy that could derail new medical advances and lead to
a shortage of medical implants of all types, including pacemakers, heart valves,
and plastic shunts used to drain uids from the brain."266 A similar article in
the Los Angeles Times reported, on October 25, 1995, that \[s]ooner than we
imagine, the supply of silicone for such medical devices { and for heart pace-
264See Mahlum, 970 P.2d at *109.
265See Law, supra note 88, at 53.
266Trisha Gura, Implant Debate to Cripple Innovation; Liability Fears May Impede Testing,
Limit Supplies, Chi. Trib., Mar. 13, 1995, at 1.
69makers, intraocular lenses, articial ngers and wrist joints and implantable
drug-delivery pumps { may be severely threatened."267 On the other hand, a
New York Times article blamed increased FDA caution in approving new drugs
and devices in the wake of debacles such as the breast implant controversy
for the movement of biomedical rms abroad.268 Thus, these articles clearly
demonstrate the FDA's dicult task of promoting safety without overly deter-
ring innovation or limiting choice. Moreover, the FDA, as administrative agency
may be slow to respond to new public health problems, has limited sta to mon-
itor a large amount of products, has a limited budget, and largely depends on
the manufacturers to provide the necessary safety information.269
Nevertheless, the nal responsibility for regulation in the area of medical devices
should remain with the FDA, and some changes could improve FDA's regula-
tion in this area. As Larry R. Pilot and Daniel R. Waldmann note in their
article, \Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997: Medical
Device Provisions," expanded use of a third party review system to evaluate the
eectiveness of devices could improve eciency.270 This type of review system,
used successfully by European Union countries for some time, calls on accred-
ited third party experts to review pre-market review applications and to certify
compliance with quality regulations. Proper use of this system could free up
267Katherine Dowling, A Class Action Nightmare; Wide-Ranging Suits Against Manufac-
turers May Keep Lifesaving Medical Devices on the Shelf and Out of Reach, L.A. Times, Oct.
25, 1995, at 9.
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70FDA resources to deal with more serious safety issues without sacricing con-
sumer health.271 In addition, in the case of medical device and drug regulation,
those prescribing the devices and drugs, must also take more responsibility for
ensuring that manufacturers adequately test their products. As suggested by
Rebecca Dresser, Wendy Wagner, and Paul Giannelli in their article, \Breast
Implants Revisited: Beyond Science on Trial," especially in the case of elective
procedures such as cosmetic surgery, the medical community must not permit
concern for prots to overshadow concern for the patient.272 Thus, while the
nal checkpoint for product safety should rest with the FDA, ideally the agency
should not have to prod manufacturers into conducting adequate safety tests of
their products.
VI. Conclusion
An article published in the Houston Chronicle on December 5, 1999 reported
that
silicone implants may soon return to the market. Both Mentor Corporation
and McGhan Medical Corporation have expressed condence that the FDA will
soon lift its limitation on the use of silicone implants, and McGhan's CEO has
projected that silicone implant sales will quickly rise to overtake sales of saline
implants. The article further reported that McGhan will have submitted all the
271See id at *273.
272See Rebecca S. Dresser et. al., Breast Implants Revisited: Beyond Science on Trial, 1997
Wis. L. Rev. 705, *772 (1997).
71necessary safety information to the FDA by 2002.273 Considering the extent of
the silicone implant debacle of the late 1980s and early 1990s, it is amazing to
think that silicone implants could again become popular. Hopefully, these new
silicone implants will not suer the same fate as their predecessors.
273See Eric Rosenberg, Silicone Breast Implants May be Back on the Market Soon, Hous.
Chron., Dec. 5, 1999, at 25.
72